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Date: February
10, 2008
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates Munich
Conference on Security Policy
Thank
you for that introduction. I would also like to thank the people of
Munich for once again allowing us to gather in this beautiful city.
I am glad to see many of my colleagues here, as
well as many of the delegations that were with us in Vilnius for the
NATO ministerial. As I said in Vilnius – three weeks ago I accomplished
a key goal I have been pursuing for the last year: through the good
offices of the Los Angeles Times, I finally brought unity to NATO
– though perhaps not as I had wished.
It is an honor to be invited to speak here for a
second, and last, year as U.S. Secretary of Defense.
Vilnius was my fourth NATO ministerial since taking
this post, but my first in a nation that had been part of the former
Soviet Union. Lithuania was one of the first nations to be swallowed by
the Soviets, and the first republic to declare its independence as
Baltic push came to Soviet shove. It is now a proud member of NATO, and
the leader of a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan.
For the transatlantic alliance, the period in which
Lithuania and other captive nations gained their independence was a time
of reflection. Not only were we pondering enlargement to secure the
wave of democracy sweeping across Eastern Europe, but NATO was also
pondering the very concept of collective self-defense in a post- Cold
War world.
We saw this in 1991, when NATO issued its first
Strategic Concept. This document recognized that [QUOTE] a “single
massive and global threat ha[d] given way to diverse and
multi-directional risks” [UNQUOTE] – challenges such as weapons
proliferation; disruption of the flow of vital resources; ethnic
conflict; and terrorism. Overcoming these threats, the document stated,
would require a “broad approach to security,” with political, economic,
and social elements.
From the perspective of one who played a role in
that effort to redirect NATO 17 years ago, today I would like to
discuss a subject that embodies the security challenges that have
emerged since that time, and correspondingly, the capabilities we need,
in this new era.
That subject is, not surprisingly,
Afghanistan. After six years of war, at a time when some may sense
frustration, impatience, or even exhaustion with this mission, I believe
it is valuable to step back and take stock of Afghanistan:
·
First, within the context of the long-standing purpose
of the Alliance, and how it relates to the threats of a post Cold
War world;
·
Second, with regard to NATO’s vision of becoming a
transformed, multifaceted, expeditionary force – and how we have
evolved in accordance with that vision; and
·
Finally, to recapitulate to the people of Europe the
importance of the Afghanistan mission and its relationship to the
wider terrorist threat.
There is little doubt that the mission in
Afghanistan is unprecedented. It is, in fact, NATO’s first ground war
and it is dramatically different than anything NATO has done before.
However, on a conceptual level, I believe it falls squarely within the
traditional bounds of the Alliance’s core purpose: to defend the
security interests and values of the transatlantic community.
During the 1990s, even as we tried to predict what
form the threats of the 21st century would take, Afghanistan was, in
reality becoming exactly what we were discussing in theory.
Subsequent events during the intervening years have shown that:
·
Instability and conflict abroad have the potential to
spread and strike directly at the hearts of our nations;
·
New technology and communications connect criminal and
terrorist networks far and wide, and allow local problems to become
regional and even global;
·
Economic, social, and humanitarian problems caused by
massive immigration flows radiate outward with little regard for
national borders;
·
A nexus between narcotics and terrorists increases the
resources available to extremists in the region, while increasing
the drug flow to European streets; and
·
The presence of safe havens, combined with a lack of
development and governance, allow Islamic extremists to turn a
poisonous ideology into a global movement.
More than five years ago in Prague, in the wake of
the September 11th attacks, our nations set out to transform NATO into
an expeditionary force capable of dealing with the threats of this type
– capable of helping other nations help themselves to avoid
Afghanistan’s fate. At the time, I imagine many were unsure of what,
exactly, this would look like – what new structures, training, funding,
mindsets, and manpower would be needed. Since then, however, we have
applied our vision on the ground in Afghanistan.
Today:
·
Nearly 50,000 troops from some 40 allies and partner
nations serve under NATO command, thousands of miles from the
Alliance’s traditional borders;
·
Growing numbers of reconstruction and security
training teams are making a real difference in the lives of the
Afghan people; and
·
NATO’s offensive and counterinsurgency operations in
the South have dislodged the Taliban from their strongholds and
reduced their ability to launch large scale or coordinated attacks.
Due to NATO’s efforts, as Minister Jung pointed out
yesterday, Afghanistan has made substantial progress in health care,
education, and the economy – bettering the lives of millions of its
citizens.
Through the Afghan mission, we have developed a
much more sophisticated understanding of what capabilities we need as an
Alliance and what shortcomings must be addressed.
Since the Riga summit, there has been much focus on
whether all allies are meeting their commitments and carrying their
share of the burden. I have had a few things to say about that
myself. In truth, virtually all allies are fulfilling the individual
commitments they have made. The problem is that the Alliance as a whole
has not fulfilled its broader commitment from Riga to meet the force
requirements of the commander in the field.
As we think about how to satisfy those
requirements, we should look more creatively at other ways to ensure
that all allies can contribute more to this mission – and share the
burden. But we must not – we cannot – become a two-tiered Alliance of
those willing to fight and those who are not. Such a development, with
all its implications for collective security, would effectively destroy
the Alliance.
As many of you know, a Strategic Vision document is
being drafted that will assess NATO’s and our partners’ achievements in
Afghanistan, and will produce a set of realistic goals and a roadmap to
meet them over the next three to five years. We continue urgently to
need a senior civilian – a European in my view – to coordinate all
non-military international assistance to the Afghan government and
people. The lack of such coordination is seriously hampering our
efforts to help the Afghans build a free and secure country.
The really hard question the Alliance faces is
whether the whole of our effort is adding up to less than the sum of its
parts, and, if that is the case, what we should do to reverse the
equation.
As an Alliance, we must be willing to discard some
of the bureaucratic hurdles that have accumulated over the years and
hinder our progress in Afghanistan. This means more willingness to
think and act differently – and quickly. To pass initiatives such as
the NATO Commander’s Emergency Response Fund. This tool has proven
itself elsewhere, but will, for NATO, require a more flexible approach
to budgeting and funding.
Additionally, it is clear that we need a common set
of training standards for every one going to Afghanistan – whether they
are combat troops conducting counterinsurgency operations; civilians
working in Provincial Reconstruction Teams; or members of operational
mentoring and liaison training teams. Unless we are all on the same
page – unless our efforts are tied together and unified by similar
tactics, training, and goals – then the whole of our efforts will indeed
be less than the sum of the parts.
I also worry that there is a developing theology
about a clear-cut division of labor between civilian and military
matters – one that sometimes plays out in debates over the respective
roles of the European Union and NATO, and even among the NATO allies.
In many respects, this conversation echoes one that has taken place –
and still is – in the United States within the civilian and military
agencies of the U.S. government as a result of the Afghanistan and Iraq
campaigns.
For the United States, the lessons we have learned
these past six years – and in many cases re-learned – have not been easy
ones. We have stumbled along the way, and we are still learning. Now,
in Iraq, we are applying a comprehensive strategy that emphasizes the
security of the local population – those who will ultimately take
control of their own security – and brings to bear in the same place and
often at the same time civilian resources for economic and political
development.
We have learned that war in the 21st century does
not have stark divisions between civilian and military components. It
is a continuous scale that slides from combat operations to economic
development, governance and reconstruction – frequently all at the same
time.
The Alliance must put aside any theology that
attempts clearly to divide civilian and military operations. It is
unrealistic. We must live in the real world. As we noted as far back
as 1991, in the real world, security has economic, political, and social
dimensions. And vice versa. In the future, the E.U. and NATO will have
to find ways to work together better, to share certain roles – neither
excluding NATO from civilian-military operations nor barring the E.U.
from purely military missions. In short, I agree entirely with
Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer and Minister Morin’s comments
yesterday that there must be a “complimentarity” between the E.U. and
NATO.
At the same time, in NATO, some allies ought not to
have the luxury of opting only for stability and civilian operations,
thus forcing other Allies to bear a disproportionate share of the
fighting and the dying.
Overall, the last few years have seen a dramatic
evolution in NATO’s thinking and in its posture. With all the new
capabilities we have forged in the heat of battle – and with new
attitudes – we are seeing what it means to be expeditionary. What is
required to spread stability beyond our borders. We must now commit
ourselves to institutionalize what we have learned and to complete our
transformation.
Just as we must be realistic about the nature and
complexity of the struggle in Afghanistan, so too must we be realistic
about politics in our various countries. NATO, after all, is an
alliance whose constituent governments all answer to their citizens.
My colleagues in Vilnius and those in this room
certainly understand the serious threat we face in Afghanistan. But I
am concerned that many people on this continent may not comprehend the
magnitude of the direct threat to European security. For the United
States, September 11th was a galvanizing event – one that opened the
American public’s eyes to dangers from distant lands. It was especially
poignant since our government had been heavily involved in Afghanistan
in the 1980s, only to make the grievous error – for which I was at least
partly responsible – of abandoning a destitute and war-torn nation after
the last Soviet soldier crossed the Termez bridge.
While nearly all the Alliance governments
appreciate the importance of the Afghanistan mission, European public
support for it is weak. Many Europeans question the relevance of our
actions and doubt whether the mission is worth the lives of their sons
and daughters. As a result, many want to remove their troops. The
reality of fragile coalition governments makes it difficult to take
risks. And communicating the seriousness of the threat posed by Islamic
extremism in Afghanistan, the Middle East, Europe, and globally remains
a steep challenge.
As opinion leaders and government officials, we are
the ones who must make the case publicly and persistently.
So now I would like to add my voice to those of
many allied leaders on the continent and speak directly to the people of
Europe: The threat posed by violent Islamic extremism is real – and it
is not going away to go away. You know all too well about the attacks
in Madrid and London. But there have also been multiple smaller attacks
in Istanbul, Amsterdam, Paris, and Glasgow, among others. Numerous
cells and plots have been disrupted in recent years as well – many of
them seeking large-scale death and destruction, such as:
-
A complex plot to down multiple airliners over
the Atlantic that could have killed hundreds or even thousands;
-
A plot to use ricin and release cyanide in the
London Underground;
-
A separate plan for a chemical attack in the
Paris metro;
-
Plots in Belgium, England, and Germany involving car bombs
that could have killed hundreds;
-
Homemade bombs targeting commuter and
high-speed trains in Spain and Germany;
-
Individuals arrested in Bosnia with explosives,
a suicide belt, and an instructional propaganda video;
-
Two plots in Denmark involving explosives,
fertilizer, and a bomb-making video; and
-
Just in the last few weeks, Spanish authorities
arrested 14 Islamic extremists in Barcelona suspected of planning
suicide attacks against public transportation systems in Spain,
Portugal, France, Germany, and Britain.
Imagine, for a moment, if some or all of these
attacks had come to pass. Imagine if Islamic terrorists had managed to
strike your capitals on the same scale as they struck in New
York. Imagine if they had laid their hands on weapons and materials
with even greater destructive capability – weapons of the sort all too
easily accessible in the world today. We forget at our peril that the
ambition of Islamic extremists is limited only by opportunity.
We should also remember that terrorist cells in
Europe are not purely homegrown or unconnected to events far away – or
simply a matter of domestic law and order. Some are funded from
abroad. Some hate all western democracies, not just the United States.
Many who have been arrested have had direct connections to Al Qaeda.
Some have met with top leaders or attended training camps abroad. Some
are connected to Al Qaeda in Iraq. In the most recent case, the
Barcelona cell appears to have ties to a terrorist training network run
by Baitullah Mehsud, a Pakistan-based extremist commander affiliated
with the Taliban and Al Qaeda – who we believe was responsible for the
assassination of Benazir Bhutto.
What unites them is that they are all followers of
the same movement – a movement that is no longer tethered to any strict
hierarchy but one that has become an independent force of its own.
Capable of animating a corps of devoted followers without direct
contact. And capable of inspiring violence without direct orders.
It is an ideological movement that has, over the
years, been methodically built on the illusion of success. After all,
about the only thing they have accomplished recently is the death of
thousands of innocent Muslims while trying to create discord across the
Middle East. So far they have failed. But they have twisted this
reality into an aura of success in many parts of the world. It raises
the question: What would happen if the false success they proclaim
became real success? If they triumphed in Iraq or Afghanistan, or
managed to topple the government of Pakistan? Or a major Middle Eastern
government?
Aside from the chaos that would instantly be sown
in the region, success there would beget success on many other fronts as
the cancer metastasized further and more rapidly than it already has.
Many more followers could join their ranks, both in the region and in
susceptible populations across the globe. With safe havens in the
Middle East, and new tactics honed on the battlefield and transmitted
via the Internet, violence and terrorism worldwide could surge.
I am not indulging in scare tactics. Nor
am I exaggerating either the threat or inflating the consequences of a
victory for extremists. Nor am I saying that the extremists are ten
feet tall. The task before us is to fracture and destroy this movement
in its infancy – to permanently reduce its ability to strike globally
and catastrophically, while deflating its ideology. Our best
opportunity as an alliance to do this is in Afghanistan. Just as the
hollowness of Communism was laid bare with the collapse of the Soviet
Union, so too would success in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, strike a
decisive blow against what some commentators have called Al Qaeda-ism.
This is a steep challenge. But the events of the
past year have proven one thing above all else: If we are willing to
stand together, we can prevail. It will not be quick, and it will not
be easy – but it can be done.
In the years ahead, the credibility of NATO, and
indeed the viability of the Euro-Atlantic security project itself, will
depend on how we perform now. Other actors in the global arena –
Hezbollah, Iran and others – are watching what we say and what we do,
and making choices about their own future course.
Everyone knows that in 2009 the
United States will have a new administration. And this time, next year,
you will be hearing from a new Secretary of Defense.
But regardless of which party is
in power, regardless of who stands at this podium, the threats we face
now and in the future are real. They will not go away. Overcoming them
will require unity between opposition parties and across various
governments, and uncommon purpose within the Alliance and with other
friends and partners.
I began my remarks with a bit of history about NATO
in the 1990s. I would like to close with a few words about the dawn of
the transatlantic Alliance.
From our present-day vantage point, victory in the
Cold War now seems almost preordained. But as we prepare to celebrate
NATO’s 60th anniversary next year, it is useful to recall that 60 years
ago this year, in 1948, the year of the Berlin airlift, few people would
have been all that optimistic about the future of Europe, or the
prospect of a Western alliance. The Continent was devastated, its
economy in shambles. The United States was debating the European
recovery program – known as the Marshall Plan – and faced a resurgent
isolationism. Europe was under siege – with pressure from communism
being felt in Germany, France, Finland, Norway, Italy, Czechoslovakia,
and Greece.
In January of that year, Ernest Bevin, the British
foreign secretary, went before parliament to discuss the Soviet Union
and other threats to the United Kingdom. Between all the “kindred souls
of the West,” he said, “there should be an effective understanding bound
together by common ideals for which the Western Powers have twice in one
generation shed their blood.”
Less than two months later, President Harry Truman
stood in the United States Congress and echoed that sentiment. He said:
“The time has come when the free men and women of the world must face
the threat to their liberty squarely and courageously . . . Unity of
purpose, unity of effort, and unity of spirit are essential to
accomplish the task before us.”
That unity held for decades through ups and downs.
It held despite divisions and discord, stresses and strains, and through
several crises where another war in Europe loomed. Alexis de
Tocqueville once warned that democracies, when it came to foreign
affairs, were ill-suited to pursue a “great undertaking” and “follow it
[through] with determination.” But the democracies of the West did just
that – for more than 40 years. And they can do so once more today.
We must find the resolve to confront together a new
set of challenges. So that, many years from now, our children and their
children will look back on this period as a time when we recommitted
ourselves to the common ideals that bind us together. A time when we
again faced a threat to peace and to our liberty squarely and
courageously. A time when we again shed blood and helped war devastated
people nourish the seeds of freedom and foster peaceful, productive
societies. That mission drew us together in 1948 and keeps us together
today.
Many years from now, perhaps future generations
will look back on this period and say, “victory seemed almost
preordained.”
Thank you
Q&A:
Horst Teltschik: Thank you Secretary Gates
for this very important speech for this conference. Ladies and
gentlemen, we have a hell of a lot of participants who want to intervene
– now 16 people. We have half an hour. I might use the traffic light
system – that means green, you are allowed to speak; yellow, come to an
end; and red, please stop it. And I give you two minutes each. The
first one is Mr. Ostrovsky, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the Duma.
Mr. Ostrovsky, the Chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the Duma: Distinguished Mr. Secretary, thank
you for a very comprehensive report that the audience has just heard.
Unfortunately I couldn’t hear two assessments and my question will be
double fault. First, at present the entire world faces the threat of
terrorism which emanates primarily from Al Qaeda, the terrorist
organization. Don’t you think that in the first place this organization
for its appearance and the serious threat of terrorism we witness today,
it is the fault of the leadership of your country and of your security
services in the 1970s and the 80s of the last century, when for American
money, with the active political support the Afghan mujahedin were
fighting the Soviet troops who tried to support peace and order in that
country. And after that when the Soviet troops left, for all intents
and purposes, people who have been created by you were idle. This is
the first part of my question.
The second part is the threat that the
countries of central Asia experienced, the countries of eastern and
western Europe, Russia, the threat of drug trafficking, the constant
increase in drug trafficking, and primarily in our country because the
United States does not touch upon this question because these
territories are far distant. Don’t you think that the leadership of
your country, when it changed the regime in Afghanistan, they forgot to
ensure something – the continuity of what existed under the Taliban,
whether they were bad or good, but under them the production of opium
and heroin was completely stopped. Now the new government is incapable
of coping with that problem and the amount of drugs reaching Russia, the
central Asian republics, and Europe is growing with every day. Thank
you.
Mr. Westerwelle, head of the Free Democratic
Party in the German Parliament: Minister, first of all, thank you
very much for your comments. And indeed, Secretary, I think that it’s
important to understand and to stress that the success of our operations
in Afghanistan is linked to our own European security. This is
something that we see eye-to-eye on in Germany and Europe -- the
majority of us. But concerning our contribution to Afghanistan, I would
just like to make a comment. Before this conference we had a discussion
on this subject among the partners and this was in fact reflected in the
media. Now when we consider our contribution in the north of
Afghanistan, we don’t see the point in reducing this to assume
responsibility elsewhere. The operations of the Germans in the north
are not something that lacks danger. We have tragically lost a lot of
service men and women there already. It is an operation, which is
successful because we have always said that we want to have this
military assistance for civilian reconstruction there. Therefore we
think that it would be wiser to continue what we have been doing so far
in the north successfully. I have made this comment just to point out
this is not just the opinion of the federal government, as heard from
the Defense Minister yesterday. But this is the opinion of the large
majority of the German parliament, the Bundestag, and since you referred
to this question, Secretary, I would just like to refer to this as
well. There is this discussion among the leading parties in Germany and
this is an opinion, which the government has and which is supported by
the majority of the population and the parties.
Mr. Rassoul, Senior Advisor to Mr. Karzai:
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, I would like here first to thank the United
States for liberating Afghanistan and contributing generously to its
reconstruction and development. I would also like to say that the
Afghan people are deeply grateful for the sacrifices and assistance that
all nations, present in this hall and outside of this hall, for
defending Afghanistan and its democratic institutions. I would like to
say also that Afghanistan should be seen also within its regional
context. The issue of [inaudible], financing, training of terrorists
should be considered. And also much more focus should be given to the
training and equipping of the Afghanistan National Army and Afghan
National Police, which is going to be the way for the future. Of
course, economic development and education are also important factors to
defeat terrorism and extremism. And finally, Mr. Secretary, Afghanistan
is in the front line of the war on terrorism. The Afghan people -- with
your help -- is fully determined to succeed against our common threat,
which is terrorism and extremism. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman: Thank you, Horst, and
thank you Bob Gates for a very insightful, eloquent and important
statement. I want to say to my fellow delegates here at the Munich
conference that what Bob Gates has said this morning is not just the
position of Secretary Gates. It is not just the opinion of the Bush
Administration on Afghanistan. It is the American position on
Afghanistan. This is one of those unusual cases in the United States
today where there really is bipartisan agreement on a matter of foreign
policy. Not just Senator McCain, but Senator Clinton and Senator Obama,
have very similar positions on the question of Afghanistan. The
Secretary of Defense who appears at this conference next year, I
predict, will say exactly what Secretary Gates has said this year; and
in some senses, if I may say to our European allies in NATO, that
Secretary will say it free of the unpopularity of President Bush here in
Europe. But the substance of it will be exactly the same.
Secondly, we have learned some lessons in
Iraq. They have been painful. One is that numbers matter, that the
number if troops we added as part of the surge had an effect in putting
Al Qaeda and the extremists on the run. But the other thing we learned
is that military victory is not enough in these conflicts. You need
also to train, to make economic investments that lead to development,
self-governance, and self-defense. So these are the discussions we are
having about what we hope our allies in NATO will do more of in
Afghanistan to ensure success.
We appreciate very much what you have
done. And as Bob Gates said, very importantly we understand that making
war is difficult in a democracy – and it should be; and that the
contributions that our European allies have made have been substantial
and admirable because in many cases the leaders are taking action that
is not supported by the public here in Europe. We appreciate that
deeply and I thank Bob particularly for going beneath the discussions we
are having about more troops, caveats, who does what, to the underlying
question of how we can help you help the publics here in Europe make the
connection between what I might say is the [inaudible] of the Homeland
Security committee in the United States Senate. Dealing with my
colleagues in European parliaments and understanding the genuine and
deep concern that the people of Europe have about domestic violent
Islamic extremism and terrorism, it is important to make the link
between that and what we are doing in Afghanistan. This is a global war
we are in. It looks like no other war we have ever fought, but it is
global. It has an ideology. It has a goal. And to state it as simply
as we can, if we allow Afghanistan to become again a failed state, we
will not only have abandoned the people of Afghanistan to the terrible
lives that they had under the Taliban, but we will have created a failed
state from which violent action will be taken against people in Munich
and London and Paris and all the other cities of Europe. That’s the
connection that we need to help you make. This war is not popular in
America, no more than the war in Iraq is, but it is the judgment of the
leaders of both parties, and I think the American people, that it is a
necessary war because, as Afghanistan goes, so too will go our own
security and yours.
I would say very briefly that in all the
discussions and debates we have today about accession to NATO and the
different points of disagreement between the U.S. and Russia, these all
pale in comparison to the transcendent challenge of our time, which is
violent Islamic extremism and terrorism. On this, we are all on the
same side because this movement threatens the fundamental values of all
of our societies, which value individual life and freedom. The enemy
that we face obviously has a very, very different worldview. A week or
10 days ago, the terrorist in Baghdad sent two mentally disabled women
into markets, strapped with explosives, and blew them up by remote. Now
I think we have to think about what kind of evil that represents, and
understand that if we abandon or fail in Afghanistan, that evil will not
only be in Kabul, it will be in Washington and all the other capitals of
Europe. Thank you, Bob, for a great statement.
Secretary Gates: Well, with respect to the
first question and the responsibility of the United States for a revived
variety of ills, it reminded me of my old days in the CIA when people
thought that not a leaf fell around the world without CIA knowing about
it or being responsible for it. With respect to the threat from Al
Qaeda and the notion that it is the fault of the U.S., I think we have a
bit of a chicken and egg problem here. My own view is the threat from
Al Qaeda began with the Soviet invasion of a sovereign state in December
1979, a state that up to that point had not represented a threat to
anybody in the world, except to a certain extent its own people because
of its weakness and poverty. It was the Soviet invasion that in fact
created the holy warriors, the mujahedin, determined to take on the
Soviet military. The United States does not shrink from responsibility
for providing them with the tools and the weapons and whatever they
needed in order to expel a foreign invader. That same kind of religious
fervor that helped create the mujahedin and helped expel the Soviet
Union in subsequent years was distorted and certain extremists among the
mujahedin became stronger, and we have the problem we have. So I would
say if the United States, if we bear a particular responsibility for the
role of the mujahedin and Al Qaeda growing up in Afghanistan, it had
more to do with our abandonment with the country in 1989 rather than our
assistance to it in 1979. And I think that most Americans think that we
erred in turning our backs on Afghanistan after the Soviets left.
With respect to the drug trafficking
problem, there is no question but that the Taliban were very effective
in cutting down on the trade, the means seem to be, to me, means that no
one in this room and no one in the Alliance of nations working to help
Afghanistan would tolerate. If you just go out and kill all the
peasants, kill all the women, kill anybody in the fields, that’s a
pretty effective, that’s not just crop eradication, that’s farmer
eradication. I think that’s a little draconian. There is no question
that the growth of narcotics production in Afghanistan is a problem that
should concern us all, and frankly one of the deficiencies in our
strategy, whether it’s EU or NATO in Afghanistan right now, is the
absence of a comprehensive counter-narcotics strategy to begin dealing
with this problem and providing alternative means of living. My hope is
that if we get this senior coordinator that we have been talking about,
that that can be one of the action items
Second question had to do with whether the
Germans should change their mission in the north, my answer to that
would be no. The Germans are doing a terrific job in the north. Their
contribution is immensely important. They have one of the largest
contingents in Afghanistan and so I think the people ought to continue
doing what they do best. We are all grateful for the contribution that
Germany is making. To go back to my remarks, what I am really
suggesting is that none of us have an individual responsibility to do
more, but collectively as an Alliance, we have a commitment made at Riga
to do more to meet the needs of the Commander in the field, the
requirements of the Commander. I am simply reaching out to all of the
defense ministers in NATO, saying the United States has dug deep, found
3,200 Marines we can send for seven months, can you please do the same?
Can you please look, dig deep, and see if there is a greater
contribution that you can make. It’s ultimately a decision that each
country will need to make.
The third question, the problem of
sanctuaries is very clearly a problem. Although there have been
significantly fewer Taliban and Al Qaeda coming across the border in
Regional Command East in recent months, it is still clearly a problem in
Regional Command South, it is a problem that we will need to continue to
work on. Clearly, training and equipment for the Afghan National Police
and the Afghan National Army must be the centerpiece of our effort for a
long-term solution in Afghanistan. It must be eventually the Afghans’
responsibility to protect their towns and to protect their country. We
need to give as much emphasis as possible to training and equipment
measures.
Finally, just one point from Senator
Lieberman’s comments, that numbers matter. I was asked last night by a
journalist about the ratio that we have been talking about, the ratio of
troops needed to successfully fight an insurgency like the Taliban are
fighting. If you did the ratios according to the textbooks that it
would require something like 400,000 troops. My response was, first of
all that the fellow who wrote the textbook is David Petraeus and he has
shown over the past year that you don’t need to go to that kind of a
ratio if you have the right strategy and you have the right political
strategy in beginning to turn people who are reconcilable and who don’t
want to see these Taliban killers in their towns. So I think additional
force clearly is required. A huge additional force, I think, our
experience in Iraq would suggest is not necessary.
One final point, and to the Senator’s point
about military success is not sufficient. This is one place where I
think all of the allied governments that are involved in Afghanistan are
in total agreement. There is a requirement for a comprehensive strategy
in Afghanistan that combines the security part of it but also the civil
construction and economic development.
Teltschik: Thank you, Bob. We have a
second round of questions.
Mr. Jandrokovic, Foreign Minister of Croatia:
I would like to thank Defense Secretary Gates for an overview of the
challenges we all face in Afghanistan. From the perspective of my
country which is very much engaged in the operation, presently with 200
soldiers operating with no caveats and while increasing our contingent
to 300 this year, Croatia is deeply interested in seeking a success in
Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, many things are at stake, making NATO’s
mission truly important. We all know that development is not possible
without security, and security is not sustainable without development.
It is why we need the comprehensive approach. My question to Defense
Secretary Gates in that regard would be, what seems to be the main
obstacle in developing a truly efficient political-military synergy in
Afghanistan?
Mr. Bütikofer, head of the Green Party in the
German Parliament: I do agree with the importance of NATO’s task in
Afghanistan, as you have laid it out, but I do not agree that with what
I would call an attempt at leadership by finger pointing or scapegoating.
If we went into finger pointing, Europeans might be tempted to ask who
it was that was distracted from Afghanistan in 2003. I don’t think that
will help us in the present situation. I also agree with a point you
made that there are some who want to fight and some who don’t. In fact,
this nation has the fourth largest number of casualties of all nations
engaged in Afghanistan. The German government has just agreed to take
over the responsibility for QRF in the north. So I don’t think this is
helpful. In fact the discussion among NATO members I believe is a
different one. That is about sorting out our strategy. You just
mentioned that we need a comprehensive strategy. The effort is not
going to be one militarily. But the comprehensive strategy isn’t there
on the ground. If we don’t correct that, we will not make our efforts a
winning proposition in Afghanistan. I would like to hear more from you
about correcting these strategic mistakes that we have made. Thank you.
Mrs. Gisela Stuart, British Parliament: A
number of people have mentioned how difficult it is to go to war in
democracies. I think we need more help to explain to our voters what
success means in Afghanistan. In democracies we tend to think just
having a successful election is the first step – and I think it is an
important step. But I think we need clearer pathways as to when this
war has been won and what the stages our, because all of us face
increased restrictions on our personal liberties, as part of that war on
terrorism. And again, I think our voters need to have a clearer
understanding when our individual liberties are being restricted. But
Secretary Gates, I would be really grateful if you just said a little
bit more about Pakistan. I don’t think we can win in Afghanistan
without a stable Pakistan and the kind of military cooperation you
foresee with them.
Mr. Bonde, German Parliament: Secretary
Gates, my impression is that in these debates we always talk about our
common interest, namely the successful stabilization of Afghanistan but
very often we should talk more intensively about how we can do this,
what helps and what does not help. In this connection, I would like to
ask a question. In Germany, for us, the question of the south of
Afghanistan is discussed a lot, not least because of your letter. When
we consider the harsh criticism of President Karzai concerning the UK,
the discussion is how can it be that the impression the Alliance always
seems to portray is whose fault it is if something goes wrong. Why is it
not discussed what strategies do we need and what is the right strategy
for the south, where there are considerable doubts as to whether we are
in fact moving in the right direction. Of course there is the question
of counter-insurgency and casualties and targeted killings. I think we
should have a more offensive discussion. I really think there are
differentiations concerning the right strategy here.
Secretary Gates: First, a principal
obstacle to improved military synergy in Afghanistan is something that I
have called for almost since taking this job and that is the need for
someone, a senior person from Europe, who can bring together the EU,
NATO, and if necessary the United Nations, in terms of coordinating the
activities that are going on in Afghanistan on the civil side. The
problem that we face is an embarrassment of riches. We have many, many
countries, dozens of countries helping in Afghanistan. We have scores of
non-governmental organizations engaged in Afghanistan. There is no one
place where information is brought together about what’s working and
what’s not working, about where you could cross provincial lines to
great effect and efficiency in particular kinds of projects. No focus
on what the priorities should be. Should all of these efforts be
focused for some period of time on road building or building electrical
capacity. There is just no order to the process. There is no place
where anybody even knows everything that is going on at one given time
in Afghanistan so I think this is why this position is so important.
Frankly it is disappointing that President Karzai came to see this
position as being somehow threatening to him. What we are looking for
is not for somebody to tell President Karzai how to run his country. We
are looking for somebody who will tell all of us what we ought to be
doing, and how we ought to be coordinating our work better, to the
benefit of Afghanistan. I think the absence of that coordination is the
principal obstacle at this point
The second question with respect to finger
pointing and scapegoating, I think it’s worth pointing out that in the
comments I have made over the past few weeks, I haven’t singled out a
single country. This is a problem that the Alliance has, not that any
individual country has. It’s the Alliance that needs to face up to
this. This is why I made the point in my remarks this morning that no
individual country has failed to fulfill its commitment. The problem we
have is the broader commitment made at Riga that the Alliance would meet
the force needs of the Commander in the field. I would say that the
notion of some fighting and some not fighting is self-evident to some
people. Again I wasn’t pointing at Germany at all. Frankly it seems a
little overly sensitive since Germany was never mentioned. The fact is
that we have got a number of countries there and the countries that are
not willing to go into combat know who they are, and the countries that
have suffered combat casualties, including Germany, know who they are.
So there is no effort here to cast any aspersions on Germany
whatsoever. The finger was never pointed in Germany’s direction. The
letter Germany got was one of 25 – all of which expressed the hope that
each ally would dig deeper and see what more it could do.
Third question, what does success mean in
Afghanistan? How can we help explain it to the people what success
means? NATO is in the process right now of drafting a strategy paper
that will look three to five years out. It will talk about what has been
accomplished in Afghanistan so far. It will then lay out where we would
like to see Afghanistan in three to five years, and the steps necessary
to get there. So I think it will be a comprehensive strategy, including
both the civil and the military sides, and also have milestones so that
we’ll know whether we are making progress. For a number of months, I
have believed this strategy paper is a necessary complement to having a
senior coordinating official as a way of lifting our sights from who is
going to be where in 2008 and who is pulling out in 2009 – and to focus
on the fact that this is a longer term project and we have to have a
better coordinated strategy.
In terms of Pakistan, I would say that one
of the things that has happened in Pakistan that is potentially very
important is the apparent realization on the part of the Pakistani
government in recent months that, due to the insurgency and Al Qaeda and
Taliban activity, their northwest frontier is no longer just a nuisance
to them but is potentially a threat to the existence of that
government. The assassination of Mrs. Bhutto, Al Qaeda’s threat to kill
Musharraf, to kill Kiani and other senior officials of the government,
and to de-stabilize Pakistan has finally focused them on the fact they
may have an existential threat in the northwest part of the country. My
hope is that the leadership will begin to turn their attention to that
area in a way that they have not yet because it was not deemed that
serious a threat. They need to develop good counter-insurgency
capabilities. The Pakistani Army is proud. It is effective but it was
principally trained and equipped to fight the Indians. They now face a
different kind of enemy in the northwest. As I have said before, we are
prepared to try and help them, particularly when it comes to training to
deal with that threat.
Finally, common interests: what helps, what
doesn’t. The situation in the southern part of Afghanistan: what works,
what doesn’t work. I think that, first of all, one of the things that
has been pretty clear is that the kind of counter-insurgency operations
that the United States has carried on, principally in RC East has led to
a significantly improved situation there. For the first time in RC East
there was a lower degree of violence than there was two years ago. We
also have the benefit of having several very effective provincial
governors in RC East. So I think it’s a combination of things. It’s an
effective counter-insurgency strategy. It’s the appointment of quality
– decisive, honest governors who have capability. It is blending the
civic and economic parts of counter-insurgency along with the
counter-insurgency operations. And it is moving forward as quickly as
possible with the training of the Afghan National Police and the Afghan
National Army. At the end of the day, they are the ones who are going
to be responsible for their country. The more that the local
authorities have the face of Afghans, the faster the progress will be.
Horst Teltschik: Thank you Secretary
Gates. Ladies and gentlemen, we have discussed Afghanistan in length;
twice – yesterday and this morning. I think these were very important
sessions. I apologize I have to stop here despite the fact that we have
further eight interventions. Better to leave some back than not to have
enough interventions. I would like to thank Secretary Bob Gates for
joining us this morning. He is one of the few participants who is
really staying with us all the time and having a lot of bilaterals as
well. I was told by several participants that they had very good
bilaterals with you. And I wish you all the best. You have one of the
most difficult jobs worldwide -- settling Iraq, settling Afghanistan,
and so on. I wish you luck and all the best. Thanks for coming.

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