|
Date:
February 21, 2007
Stephen Hadley, United States National Security Advisor Press
Roundtable U.S. Mission, NATO Headquarters Brussels, Belgium.
Victoria Nuland, U.S. Ambassador to NATO: Thanks for getting out of
bed so early. We are delighted to have National Security Advisor Steve
Hadley back at NATO Headquarters. As you know he is making other
European stops, but he never comes to our neighborhood without stopping
at NATO and we appreciate that enormously.
We just had a very good bilateral with Secretary General de Hoop
Scheffer and a meeting with the North Atlantic Council.
Steve, over to you.
Mr. Hadley: It’s great to be back. NATO is the place where Americans
come to have a strategic discussion with Europe about the common issues
that we face, and there are a lot of them. We covered most of them today
-- Iran, Iraq, the Middle East generally, Lebanon, Kosovo, relations
with Russia, the whole gamut.
We obviously also talked a lot about Afghanistan, the importance of
that mission. It is a challenging mission for NATO. It is important that
we succeed. We must make sure that Afghanistan does not again become a
safe haven for terror. We must make sure that Afghanistan can begin to
address the counter-narcotics problem, which is an enormous one for
Europe.
It is very important that Afghanistan not fall back to the
Afghanistan of the Taliban. It would be a tragedy for the Afghan people
who have come so far, and it would represent a renewed threat to Europe
and to North America. That’s what NATO is about. It is in Afghanistan to
provide the security component of an integrated strategy, which has
political, economic and diplomatic aspects, but all the rest of the
strategy won’t work if we don’t have a minimum level of security. That’s
of course what NATO is providing.
It’s important for NATO to succeed in that mission. We’ve been
talking about how we can expand the capabilities that the United States
and other countries are providing to that mission. I think we’re making
good progress in that respect. And it reminds us again that NATO is
first and foremost a military alliance. It is a place with real military
competence. A lot of the problems of the world have a security element
to their solution and it requires institutions like NATO to be available
to provide that security element. If we’re going to do so effectively it
means we have to put in the resources, the money, the training, the
equipment, and all the rest to ensure that when NATO takes on a military
mission it can succeed and perform effectively. That, of course,
requires this Alliance of many countries to act as one, with real
solidarity among the various member states.
So good morning here at NATO. I will go over to EU Headquarters, to
meet with Javier Solana, and hope to have a good discussion on these and
other issues. It’s been great to be back. I’d be glad to answer any
questions you’ve got.
Question: Mr. Hadley, Dan Dombey, Financial Times.
Earlier this week, Tony Blair briefed President Bush on the British
plans for Iraq. The media has been briefed extensively on the British
plans and the Prime Minister is making a statement to the House today.
Will the U.S. welcome the British plans for a phased withdrawal?
Mr. Hadley: Well we have. As the Prime Minister explained to the
President, it’s an adjustment in British forces. It reflects the
progress that has been made on the ground in Basra and in the south. It
also reflects progress on the ground in terms of the security situation,
and progress in terms of the growth of Iraqi institutions that can take
greater responsibility for security. As this happens we will, of course,
adjust force levels, adjust the missions of the forces and the kinds of
capabilities that those forces require.
So this is basically a good news story, an indication that progress
is being made and that events on the ground permit this kind of
adjustment in forces. The President supports the Prime Minister’s
decision. It’s the direction we all want Iraq to head, because it’s the
direction of eventual success.
Question: Can I just press you a little bit on it being a good news
story?
Mr. Hadley: Sure.
Question: Really only six weeks ago or so the British were thinking
of a much bigger redeployment. They were thinking of coming down to
4,500 [troops] much quicker. Instead they’re going to do that by the end
of the year. They were thinking of pulling out of Basra city. Instead,
because factional violence still remains very bad there, they’re
actually going to have to keep that presence there for some time. So
that doesn’t seem to be driven entirely about being a good news story,
because the situation hasn’t developed as the British had hoped.
Mr. Hadley: Look, as the President has said publicly, we would have
liked and had thought we would be at the end of 2006, this last year, in
a situation where the situation on the ground would permit some downward
adjustment in our own forces. Of course the sectarian violence in
Baghdad, which was spurred and began really after the bombing of the
mosque in Samarra, precluded that and has resulted in the kind of new
approach that the President talked about. So I’m not saying this is an
unalloyed picture of progress. What I am saying is that the Prime
Minister made a judgment that the progress in the south and in Basra
permitted this adjustment in the force.
Certainly, it is not the end-state where we want to be. Obviously our
goal and end-state is for the Iraqis to be able to take responsibility
for security and we can reduce dramatically forces we have engaged.
We’re not there yet. There are security challenges that remain in the
south. Of course, the security challenge we in the United States are
focusing on is supporting the Iraqis to try and bring security in
Baghdad. It is our judgment that until you get security in Baghdad
further progress on reconciliation and economic progress,
reconstruction, all these things on which true success and true security
over the long term depend, are not going to happen.
So yes, there are security challenges. The reason I described it the
way I did was [because] I didn’t want people to think [the Basra
withdrawal] reflected a lack of confidence by the British in the
mission, or a turning away from the mission. It is not. I think what you
have seen and just what you described is both some progress that has
permitted an adjustment in the forces, but also the fact that they
remain positioned in Basra and remain with the forces that got us the
indication of continued commitment to success in Iraq. We’re not there
yet. We’re not where we need to be in the south. We’re certainly not
where we need to be in Baghdad, but we believe that the Iraqis are
taking increased responsibility, have increased capability, and that we
need to support them in their efforts to take an increasing role and
responsibility for security in their country.
Question: Can I ask you about [inaudible] Russian threats about that?
Does the U.S. government talk with Russia to convince them that it’s not
targeted against them? And do you think this is the best [inaudible]
with Russians?
Mr. Hadley: It’s ironic. Fifteen years ago I came regularly to NATO
to talk about missile defense and the need for all of us to get into the
business of defending our countries against the ballistic missile
threats that we could see on the horizon and that have largely
materialized. So we argued that the Europeans need to get in this
business. In parallel, I was going to Moscow arguing that the Russians
should be in this business. That defending ourselves against ballistic
missiles was in the common interest of Russia, Europe and the United
States. So it’s a little bit amusing, because we’ve been trying to get
Russians in the business of missile defense for about 15 years.
We have been, over the course of that time, briefing the Russians
about what we’re doing, giving them opportunities to participate. In
terms of this most recent discussion about a site in Europe we’ve
briefed the Russians here, we’ve briefed the Russians in Moscow. So
they’re very aware of it. It should be clear to them that the kind of
limited capability we’re talking about poses no threat to the viability
and reliability and effectiveness of the Russian strategic deterrent.
This is about the increasing and developing ballistic missile threat
from Iran. It is an element of a strategy to try and convince Iran that
developing this capability is not in its interest. It also provides over
time the capability so that if Iran does continue to move in this
direction in terms of developing missile capabilities and warheads with
which to use them to deliver, that Europe has some defense. This is a
reasonable thing to do, it’s something Europe ought to be interested in,
it’s something that Russia ought to be interested in.
Question: [Inaudible]?
Mr. Hadley: Well as I say, we’ve been at it for 15 years to try and
convince Russia that they ought to be building missile defense rather
than building missiles. I think we just need to continue this
discussion, make it clear that this deployment is not directed at them,
is not a threat to their security, but it is an understandable step by
Europe and North America to provide a limited capability against threats
like Iran, in the same way that we’ve developed a capability to defend
against the threat from North Korea. It’s something that was useful, as
you notice, given the recent North Korean missile test about four or
five months ago.
Question: When did you brief exactly Russia about this? Yesterday
Foreign Minister [inaudible] said that when you brought some missiles at
the border it would be better to talk about it with your neighbor before
putting these missiles. So it seems that you didn’t [inaudible] European
allies about this project, according to the [inaudible] made yesterday
by Foreign Minister [inaudible].
Mr. Hadley: That we did not talk to the Russians?
Question: That you did not talk to the European allies about this
project.
Ambassador Nuland: We have briefed this project regularly over the
last year. The most recent full briefing at NATO was in early November
done by Under Secretary of Defense Eric Edelman and the head of our
Missile Defense Agency General Tray Obering, and it was done not only to
NATO Allies, but to the NATO Allies and Russia in the NATO-Russia
Council. A full technical briefing was given then, and we’ve talked
about it since in the NATO-Russia Council, and we’ve talked about it in
Moscow.
Question: So the deployment in Poland, eastern Poland, and in the
Czech Republic was part of this in November?
Ambassador Nuland: Absolutely.
Question: After Mr. Putin’s speech in [inaudible] last week, is that
a sign of changing relations between the U.S. and Russia? [Inaudible].
Mr. Hadley: Well, he did. He said he was going to take the conference
as an opportunity to speak very candidly, and I think you heard a set of
comments in which, quite frankly, we were disappointed. I think a lot of
Europeans were disappointed and dismayed. I think one of the things
Europeans need to do is to make that clear to Russia and they need to
make that clear to President Putin. So we were disappointed in the
speech.
Our own view is there are a number of areas where Russia and the
United States and Europe can cooperate productively, where we have
common interests, where we can cooperate and are cooperating.
Proliferation is one, Iran is another. We will have a common challenge
of Kosovo, which is very important for European security. There are a
range of issues on which we have been able to work with Russia and want
to continue to do so. As I say, I think some of the rhetoric was
unfortunate and belied the fact that there are common interests where we
can cooperate together.
Question: How worrying is that at a time when those common interests
have actually really now been active? Just to take two examples, the
talks on the final stages of Kosovo begin today with the hopes that it
comes to the Security Council next month. Today or tomorrow El Baradei
will report to the IAEA and eventually the UN Security Council on Iran’s
non-compliance with 1737. At a time when you really need Russia not to
veto, at the very least, these issues in the Security Council. How
worrying is that?
Mr. Hadley: One of the things I think we need to be careful of is how
we talk about how we really need Russia to do this. Look, one of the
things President Putin has been very clear on, is that a nuclear Iran is
not in Russia’s interest. Russia is participating in this discussion and
this strategy in Iran not as a favor to us, but because Russia has
decided that it is in their interest that there not be a nuclear Iran.
They’re right about that.
Question: Is that why they halted work on Bushehr, do you think?
Mr. Hadley: They have actually been, over the years of the Bush
administration, you have seen I think an evolution in Russian policy
where they have been increasingly concerned about the proliferation of
risks associated with Bushehr and they have entered into understandings
with the Iranians to mitigate some of those risks in terms of fuel
take-back and the like.
Secondly, Russia has engaged with us and European countries in the
diplomacy that has resulted in Security Council resolutions on Iran. I
think it’s a clear message to Iran from the international community that
a nuclear Iran is not in the international community’s interest and will
not be in long term Iranian interest. If Iran continues to pursue a
nuclear weapon, it will result in isolating Iran and the Iranian people
from the international community. That is unfortunate for a country like
Iran that has a proud history, an established culture, a very rich
heritage and very able people that should be part of the international
community, rather than isolated from it. But regrettably, the Iranian
regime has pursued a policy of pursuing a nuclear program in defiance of
the international community. The result is that it’s increasingly
isolated.
Russia has been a participant in that process because it’s made a
judgment that an Iran with a nuclear weapon is not in its interest. It’s
a right judgment and we want to continue to work with all the
international community. This is not just a few parties. This is the
position of the UN Security Council, it’s the position of the IAEA Board
of Governors, it’s the position of most responsible states that it is
not good for the international community for Iran to pursue its nuclear
program. We will continue to work with Russia and all other like-minded
states to try and deal with that problem.
Question: El Baradei said this week that he thought Iran had
[inaudible] mastered technology to [inaudible] in terms of mastered
technology [inaudible]. Do you think Iran has mastered the technology?
Has it passed that point of no return?
Mr. Hadley: One of the reasons we have thought it was so important
and why the international community has called on the Iranians to
suspend their enrichment program is to buy us some time to see if we can
negotiate a permanent resolution of this issue. The reason is because
the longer Iran is able to spin centrifuges the more time they have to
try and develop, [and] to deal with the technical challenges.
These enrichment facilities are pretty challenging things technically
and a lot of problems have to be solved as you move from basically
research or prototypes into production-scale facilities. Obviously, we
would like to have a pause so that Iran does not make further progress
and so that the international community has an opportunity to try and
negotiate a solution to this problem along the lines of the proposal
that the EU-3 presented here six, nine months ago.
We don’t know exactly where Iran is in this process. El Baradei
reflects the kind of concern that led the international community to say
that the first step for resolution needed to be a suspension of the
enrichment program.
We have said clearly that if Iran will suspend the enrichment program
we would join with the EU-3 and Russia and China and sit down and try
and negotiate a permanent resolution of this issue. So it’s again that
kind of concern that has provoked the position that the international
community has taken about wanting to see a suspension of any further
spinning of centrifuges.
Question: On Afghanistan. You told us that NATO [inaudible] provide
all the necessary means, whatever, to be successful in Afghanistan.
Mr. Hadley: I said it needs to do that.
Question: But what is lacking? We are in a good way, that means we
are not yet there. So what is exactly lacking? I remember that the
Canadians I think threatened to pull out troops in two years time. The
Germans say no, we don’t go to the south. We have 3,000 troops there and
only six Tornados. So what exactly is it? What is it that the United
States told the NAC today? What do the other countries have to do?
Voice: [Inaudible] is familiar with that.
Mr. Hadley: Correct me if I’m wrong. The NATO military authorities
have developed a set of requirements for what is required for the
mission to be successful.
Question: This is still the Jones Plan from last year or is it a new
one?
Ambassador Nuland: As you know, the SACEUR, General Craddock, updated
the requirements in advance of Seville.
Mr. Hadley: When he put what is being provided against those
requirements there was a gap. This has been the subject of recent
meetings of NATO leaders, of the Defense Ministers and Foreign
Ministers, and what you’ve seen is a response of a number of countries
to provide additional capabilities.
The President of the United States announced that we would be
increasing our contribution by three battalions. Other countries have
announced increases. We expect some additional forces to be tendered in
the months ahead.
So the goal is to try and close that gap. I cannot tell you exactly
where we are now in terms of how much of that gap is closed. We’d have
to go back to the NATO military --
Question: -- for what’s needed still?
Ambassador Nuland: As General Craddock continues to say and as SecGen
continues to say, it’s not so much about counting numbers it’s about
getting the capabilities in to do the mission and we are doing that.
Mr. Hadley: I think you’ve got to think about it in sort of four
dimensions. One is capabilities. It’s not just numbers of forces, but
are we sending the forces with the kinds of training and capabilities
that are required by the mission. It’s not just a numbers issue. Some
forces are more useful than others, and some forces are not useful at
all.
Ambassador Nuland: And flexible forces are very useful.
Mr. Hadley: The question is getting the forces that have the
capabilities required for the mission.
Secondly is getting flexibility to the local commanders in the use of
the forces. That’s where this issue of national caveats comes in. Making
sure that countries give the force to the commanders, not the forces
they have available, but the forces with the capabilities that the
commanders require. Then giving those forces to the commanders under
flexible rules of engagement and without caveats so that they can be
used by the local commanders to get the job done.
So it’s an issue of capabilities, it’s an issue of rules of
engagement and caveats. It’s also an issue of solidarity. Making clear
that we’re not dividing Afghanistan into zones allocated to individual
countries, but we are taking an approach to bringing security to the
country as a whole. That is the project that we have agreed to do and
that requires flexibility to move forces across the country where
they’re required and as they are required.
This is a tough thing. This is a multi-country alliance that is going
in to do something it really has not done before. It’s a challenge. It’s
not going to be perfect and it’s going to take some time. We’re going to
make some mistakes, [but] we’re going to try and learn from those
mistakes because we think that the capacity of NATO to perform this kind
of mission is something that we’re going to need in the 21st Century. We
think a challenge of the 21st Century is transnational challenges in
terms of terrorism, counter-narcotics, proliferation, that challenge the
capabilities of nation states and that nation states with limited
capacities will find themselves basically overwhelmed by some of these
transnational challenges. The challenge for the international community
is going to be to try and help post-conflict states, failing states,
states that face an overwhelming challenge from terror and
counter-narcotics and the like, helping those states develop the
institutions and providing the basic security that they need to buy
time, develop the institutions that will allow them to provide security
to their populations and deal with these kinds of challenges.
So the kinds of capacities we’re developing in terms of economic,
development assistance, reconstruction, getting justice systems in
place, training police, training court systems and training security
forces so that they can provide security and support national
authorities as they try and deal with these challenges is the kind of
capability we’re going to need in the 21st Century. We’re early on in
trying to develop that capability. We’re seeing it in Iraq, we’re seeing
it in Afghanistan, we’ll see it in other places as well.
Question: Two quick questions. On Iraq, did you ask anything, any
help from the Europeans or NATO this morning? Any kind of new help that
the European allies could do?
And Iran, do you still [inaudible] military option? Or is it in the
air? [Inaudible] see kind of movement [inaudible]. Is it something we
should take seriously, or just a general threat?
Mr. Hadley: The second question is something that the President has
answered, the Secretary of State has answered, the Secretary of Defense
has answered. I don’t have anything new on that. We’ve talked about the
kinds of policies that the Iranian government has pursued. We’ve talked
about the need to put pressure on the Iranian government to try and get
them to reconsider some of those policies. We have seen that Iran has
been very active in the region through Hezbollah and Hamas and has quite
frankly raised questions about its intentions in the region. One of the
things we’ve tried to do is to reassure our allies that we have a long
term commitment to the Middle East and to the security of the Middle
East to protecting those countries with whom we have longstanding
relations and encouraging a democratic evolution in the Middle East. Our
overall policy has been such.
We’ve made very clear that we are trying to get the Iranian
government to change its behavior. This is not a prelude to military
action against Iran, but at the same time of course the President says,
as every American President always has for at least since World War II
in dealing with these kinds of problems, we don’t take any option off
the table. Every President says that. This President says that as well.
But he’s made very clear that we have real issues with Iran. It’s not
just between us and Iran. There are issues that it has with the
international community, [and] we have a strategy to deal with those
problems diplomatically. That’s what we are trying to do. We think we
can do that if the United States, Europe and the international community
stand together. That’s the course we are pursuing. We’ve been very clear
about that.
Ambassador Nuland: Thank you everybody.
Mr. Hadley: Thank you.
|
