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March 11, 2008
NATO on the Way to
Bucharest 2008
Richard G. Olson, Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO
Remarks at the University of Leiden, Leiden, The Netherlands, March 11,
2008
As prepared for delivery
A warm thanks to you, Jim, for the kind introduction. Before I begin,
I’d like to recognize Brendan Troost for all of his work in putting
together today’s program, and to thank the Netherlands Atlantic Youth,
the S.I.B., and the other University of Leiden student groups for
sponsoring this event.
I am grateful for the opportunity to engage with a student audience. I
am from a generation that came to adulthood during the Cold War, and
thus instinctively grasped the importance of the Transatlantic Alliance,
but we won’t be running NATO forever. Our hope is that you, and your
peers on both sides of the Atlantic, will not only understand NATO, but
believe in NATO, and take it forward. We’ll need for you, decades after
the Cold War ended, to spread the message that today’s threats to
security – from failing states that shelter terrorists to cyberwarfare
to regional insecurity – are best countered by a strong transatlantic
alliance based on common values.
So, thank you all for attending.
This event comes at an excellent time for me to speak with you, as the
Bucharest Summit is only three short weeks away. As scholars focusing on
international relations and American studies, I don’t need to explain to
you that this Heads of State meeting will be an important one. As Prime
Minister Balkenende, President Bush, and other national leaders convene
in Romania, they will be making the decisions that will take the nearly
60 year old alliance forward.
From the U.S. perspective, we look upon NATO as the most effective
multilateral institution in the world today, and most successful
political-military alliance in history. Its nearly 60 year record has
been marked by effective deterrence in the Cold War, bringing peace and
stability to the Balkans in the nineties, and helping to spread
democracy and prosperity through partnership and enlargement. Naturally,
over the past six years (since the Prague summit in 2002), the
orientation of the Alliance has shifted. With the diminishment of
tensions in the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO has put greater emphasis on
threats coming from outside of Europe. Afghanistan is the prime example;
an Alliance that a decade ago was conducting a debate about “out of area
or out of business” now has more than 40,000 troops deployed 2,000
kilometers beyond the eastern border of the Alliance. As the Alliance
takes on a broader set of responsibilities, and an increasingly global
vocation, it has been transforming its military capabilities from static
defense to a more expeditionary capability, and Europe has been as
committed to this journey as North America.
Our expectation is that these trends will continue, and what the U.S.
would like to see emerging from the Bucharest Summit is an Alliance that
is stronger politically, stronger operationally, and functioning as a
global security contributor.
First Area: NATO as a Contributor to Global Peace and Security
When I talk about NATO as a contributor to global peace, and to security
at home, I am talking first and foremost about Afghanistan. Why is
Afghanistan so important to us?
First, the security and well-being of our societies – of all of us in
the transatlantic community – depends on our efforts in Afghanistan. We
must not allow the Taliban and al-Qaeda to re-impose their rule in
Afghanistan and thus present a major long-term threat to people in that
country and our own societies. We cannot allow Afghanistan to return to
what it was in the nineties, a haven for terrorism. As NATO Secretary
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said, “Afghanistan was the Grand Central
Station of terrorism. If this mission were not to succeed…Afghanistan
would once again pose a clear and present danger to itself, its region
and the broader international community.” I would also note that
Afghanistan’s production of heroin represents a clear and present
danger, especially to Europe which is its principal market.
Second, we must recognize that the hopes of the Afghan people for a
long-term, stable, secure, more prosperous future depend on the
assistance we can give them. We are doing the right thing in
Afghanistan, and we cannot turn our backs on the Afghan people and allow
those who brutalized them in the past to return. And without security,
there is little hope for economic development.
And third, despite the major problems and challenges we see today, we
have produced some solid results in Afghanistan and, ultimately, we can
succeed. This is not an effort in vain, but a good investment in
Afghanistan, in our own societies, and in the world. We need to remember
what we saw when the Taliban ran Afghanistan: a violent, repressive
regime that stoned women to death or poured acid on their faces, lashed
men for not praying sufficient times per day and barred girls from
attending schools. Women died because the regime banned gynecologists.
The Taliban had banned kite flying and the singing of songs, and blew up
ancient monuments that had survived the armies of Alexander, Genghis
Khan, and Timerlane. Afghanistan under the Taliban was a war-shattered
country with a brutal regime that had no hope for progress.
In 2001, eight percent of Afghans had access to a limited form of
healthcare; today we have built and outfitted over 670 hospitals and
clinics, and more than 65 percent of the population has access to
medical care. Almost 11,000 doctors, midwives, and nurses have been
trained.
In 2001, when we went into Afghanistan and liberated it from the Taliban
and al-Qaeda, only some 900,000 children were enrolled in school. Today
there are more than 5 million students in that country. More than 1.5
million of them are girls. We know the exact number of girls who were in
school in 2001 because that number was zero.
The Netherlands has played a leading role in what the Alliance has done
in Afghanistan and let me acknowledge the extremely significant Dutch
contribution to Afghan stability, with 1,700 Dutch troops providing
security and support for development assistance in Uruzgan province. The
Dutch presence has been vital in keeping Uruzgan on the path to
development. This has been a difficult assignment, which Dutch forces
have carried out with distinction.
For our part the United States is committed to supporting the building
of momentum in Afghanistan. The United States has recently stepped up
its contribution by agreeing to send 3,200 Marines, including 2,200 to
the South and 1,000 for the absolutely critical task of training the
Afghan police.
Finally, at the upcoming Summit we will ensure that the NATO approach to
Afghanistan is comprehensive – military operations cannot be conducted
in a vacuum, but must be linked with reconstruction, and training, and
even counter-narcotics initiatives. To accomplish this, the Alliance
must signal that the international community as a whole is committed to
Afghanistan for the long term. In this regard we welcome the naming of
Ambassador Kai Eide of Norway as the UN Special Representative for
Afghanistan, and hope that he will take a leading role in coordinating
the international support.
What is clearly at stake in Afghanistan is a stable, democratic, and
peaceful future, with the Afghan people able to choose their country’s
destiny. And every school that a Provincial Reconstruction Team builds,
and every tick downward in the infant mortality rate, acts to weaken
violent jihadis that threaten not only Afghans, but also the American
and the Dutch people.
Another place in which NATO acts as an essential security contributor is
Kosovo. We’ve truly seen the importance of Allied peacekeepers, which
include a Dutch contingent, to Balkan security in recent weeks. The lack
of violence in Kosovo is a testament to the work of our KFOR
peacekeepers. From protecting Orthodox churches to backing up police
forces at flashpoint locations, NATO has been an essential contributor.
It is important to note what has NOT happened in Kosovo since the
declaration of independence -- no flows of refugees or Internally
Displaced Persons out of Kosovo, no incidents at ethnic Serb patrimonial
sites, and -- most importantly -- no inter-ethnic violence. The hard
work of the 16,000-strong KFOR force has helped ensure this stability at
a critical juncture. At Bucharest we will reaffirm KFOR’s continued
commitment, under UNSC Resolution 1244, to provide security during this
transition period. For our part, the U.S. is committed to supporting
KFOR.
Beyond Afghanistan and Kosovo, NATO contributes via a training mission
in Iraq, vital support for the African Union’s Darfur mission, and a
full time anti-terrorist patrolling mission in the Mediterranean. These
missions ultimately increase the security of all of us by fighting
instability and terror in pivotal parts of the world. At Bucharest,
Allied leaders will look at how we can broaden these missions, and other
means of contributing to global peace and security.
Second Area: Meeting Emerging Challenges, Enhancing Capabilities
The strategic environment that we live in today is very different from
what it was 59 years ago when NATO was established. Today’s challenges
include: threats to our cybersecurity; securing our ships, ports, and
waters against terrorists; guaranteeing the integrity of our energy
supplies and transport links; defending our countries from missile
attack by rogue states and terrorists; and coordinating
intelligence-sharing and counterterrorism efforts. NATO must focus on
adding value to collective and individual Allied efforts to address 21st
Century threats.
First among these is the threat from the proliferation of missile
technology, especially from Iran which has made no secret of its
ambitions in this area. As you know, the U.S. is developing a Ballistic
Missile Defense system, in cooperation with the Czech and Polish
governments, that would provide protection against the long-range
missile threat to much of Europe. Some Allied territory would still
remain uncovered and especially vulnerable to short-range threats; the
challenge for NATO, based on the long-standing principle of
indivisibility of security, is whether to “bolt on” NATO’s own short
range Missile Defense systems with the U.S. contribution. The U.S.
considers it a top priority for the Alliance, to address the issue at
Bucharest and look at options for linking the U.S. and NATO systems.
NATO also cannot ignore emerging threats to cybersecurity, to the
security of energy supplies and transport links, and to the terrorist
threat to Allied ships and ports. We should look to add value in NATO’s
areas of expertise, and to link to ongoing cooperative efforts in
intelligence-sharing and counter-terrorism.
With respect to capabilities that respond to these challenges, we will
seek refinement of existing concepts at Bucharest. One example is the
need for the NATO Response Force to be right-sized and updated, to
reflect mission requirements. Another is for improved Allied efforts to
finance and procure helicopters, which have been a major shortfall in
Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, Darfur, and elsewhere, NATO must meet the
critical need for better lift capability.
Third Area: Advancing a Europe That Is Democratic, Whole, Free, and
at Peace
Completing the map of a Europe that is democratic, whole, free, and at
peace remains intrinsic to the mission of the Transatlantic Alliance.
Issues related to NATO enlargement, and to Membership Action Plan
status, will be of utmost importance at the Bucharest Summit. We will
look to continue NATO’s role as one of the most powerful magnets, and
mentors, for democratic change in global history.
The United States is a strong supporter of the principle that NATO’s
door should be open to any European democracy. For that reason we
support the broadest possible NATO enlargement. The Summit should
include bold steps to ensure a Euro-Atlantic future for Albania,
Croatia, and Macedonia. All three countries have shown steady progress
toward the benchmarks for NATO membership. As they complete this work,
the U.S. hopes for the largest possible performance-based enlargement at
Bucharest.
Also under consideration at Bucharest will be the question of enhancing
NATO’s relationship with Ukraine and Georgia, by means of the Membership
Action Plan, or MAP; a powerful tool to help fragile democracies make
the right choices, strengthen their institutions, and resist outside
pressure. U.S. policy is that Ukraine and Georgia should be accorded MAP
status, with the question of when that status should be granted being a
matter for Allied consensus.
We are aware of the diversity of views in the Alliance in this question
and are consulting with our allies. Let me raise the question: would a
delay help or hinder the development of regional stability, and the
promotion of democracy and stability in this vital part of the world? We
also favor signaling to the remaining countries of the Western Balkans
that we favor enhancing NATO’s relationship with them.
Fourth Area: NATO’s Global Partners
NATO’s network of partnerships has been critical to its success as an
institution. In Afghanistan, as I mentioned, our top priority, we have
all 26 Allies participating in one form or another, but the NATO Command
(the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF) comprises troops
from 40 nations. Many of these are established NATO partners, but others
are countries, such as Australia, that had no formal status with NATO
prior to the 2006 NATO Summit at Riga.
At the Riga Summit in 2006, the Allies launched a “global partnerships”
effort, to reflect what in reality was already taking place on the
ground. I refer to Afghanistan, where 13 non-NATO countries participate
in NATO’s ISAF force, and Kosovo, where 10 non-NATO nations serve as
peacekeepers in NATO’s KFOR mission.
At Bucharest, we should acknowledge the contributions of NATO’s global
partners, especially their contributions to Operations, but also the
fact that they are developing programs of cooperation with NATO,
partners such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand. The
U.S. looks forward to not only a larger NATO, but also to a NATO with
robust partnerships that span the globe. I will emphasize here that this
is not to say that we seek a global NATO, but rather a NATO with global
partners.
This partnerships effort also takes into account NATO’s Mediterranean
Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partnerships, its 23
Partnership for Peace bilateral relationships, as well as the critical
NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine Councils.
Of course, I’d be remiss not to mention the all-important question of
relations between NATO and the EU. As for the EU, you may be surprised
to hear me say this, but the United States stands for a strong ESDP, and
a strong Europe. From the American or from the NATO perspective, it is
beneficial for our European partners to be capable, well-equipped, and
strong when we deploy together. It is increasingly difficult for the
U.S. to bear such a heavy load when we deploy. As my boss, the U.S.
Ambassador to NATO, has said, “we need a Europe that is as united as
possible, ready and willing to bear its full measure of responsibility
for defending our common security.”
It is also a priority to continue outreach to Russia – and, I should
note here that President Putin will be at the Bucharest Summit – to work
cooperatively on a joint missile defense architecture. From radar
cooperation to unprecedented sharing of intelligence, no one can claim
that the United States has not been attempting to work with the Russians
on this issue, beginning with President Putin’s visit to President Bush
at Kennebunkport last summer. It’s not always easy, but in areas where
we can effectively cooperate, it would be a shame not to do so. And the
United States has already signaled that we look forward to working with
the incoming President Medvedev.
Moreover, practical, useful cooperation with Russia has been ongoing for
some time. Counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian
personnel, which has taken place in Russia and Turkey, and joint civil
emergency management exercises provide two good examples. On the
Mediterranean, the Russian Navy actively participates in NATO's
counter-terrorism Operation Active Endeavor. Also notable is a range of
military-to-military cooperation, from search-and-rescue at sea to joint
Special Ops and military aviation transport live exercises. Particularly
at the Military Representative level, NATO's cooperation with Russia has
been robust
As you can see, NATO has a web of truly diverse relationships that span
the globe. At Bucharest we will look to continue progress on
strengthening this web of partnerships. We have seen in recent years
that instability in remote areas of the world threatens us all, NATO and
non-NATO alike. And moreover, in places like Afghanistan, the Alliance
can always do more – but we need global partners to help us do more.
Conclusion
To conclude, allow me to again make an assertion I made at the beginning
and urge for you students of international relations to consider: NATO
has been the most successful multilateral institution, and the most
effective military alliance, in history.
From here in Leiden east all the way to Tallinn, and across the Atlantic
to Canada and the U.S., NATO remains a unique and enduring alliance,
defined both by common democratic values and our vital security
interests.
We look to come out of Bucharest with an Alliance that continues these
traditions, is ready for – and oriented towards – the future, and is as
strong and as unified as ever.
Thank you for your attention, I look forward to your questions and
comments.
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