Statement On the Future of NATO to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee
Statement by U.S. Ambassador to NATO
R. Nicholas Burns
Brussels, Belgium
April 1, 2003
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me here today. I am honored
to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss
the future of NATO, our most important Alliance and a central
pillar of U.S. foreign and defense policy. America needs a permanent
Alliance willing and able to take on the dangers posed by terrorism,
weapons of mass destruction and other new threats. The Administration's
policies are designed to ensure that NATO can continue to meet
this challenge.
Before I begin, Mr. Chairman, I want to acknowledge your leadership
in defining a sensible American policy on NATO. I very much
appreciate the advice and guidance that my team received from
you when you visited us in Brussels last year. Your commitment
to NATO throughout your Senate career has been steadfast and
very much appreciated by all of us in the United States Foreign
Service.
I would like to thank Senator Biden for his leadership of this
Committee last year, when the Senate supported both NATO's transformation
and NATO enlargement in preparation for the Prague Summit.
Let me also say that I greatly appreciate the participation
of the Congress in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. We are proud
that Congressman Doug Bereuter now serves as President of this
important forum.
Mr. Chairman, we are meeting at a moment when the United States
faces momentous challenges overseas. American and coalition
soldiers are in harm's way in Iraq, undertaking by force what
Saddam Hussein refused to do peacefully -- to disarm as demanded
by the international community for over 12 years.
Differences with a number of our long-standing Allies over
how to deal with the grave threat posed by Saddam have put a
serious strain on Trans-Atlantic ties. Just as we will have
to rebuild Iraq, we will have to bring NATO back to the consensus
and unity that marked the Prague Summit just four months ago,
when we agreed that NATO needs new members, new capabilities
and new relationships to meet the threats of the 21st century.
Today I would like to give you a view from Brussels on where
NATO is right now, where we want it to go, and how we believe
the seven invited nations will help us get there. I will try
to make the case today that the seven invited nations are ready
to become full NATO members, and that their accession is in
the best interests of the United States. I will also tell you
why I believe NATO remains our most important Alliance, and
how we seek to transform it to meet the new threats so evident
after September 11, 2001. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I will give
you my thoughts on the key challenges that NATO faces in the
period ahead.
THE U.S. ENLARGEMENT STRATEGY
Mr. Chairman, last week, on March 26, I had the honor of signing
on behalf of the United States in Brussels the Protocols on
the Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. I strongly
encourage the U.S. Senate to provide its advice and consent
to the ratification of these protocols. I am convinced that
bringing these seven nations into the Alliance will make NATO
a stronger collective defense organization and will increase
the security of the United States.
When President Bush and NATO leaders invited the seven countries
to begin accession talks with the Alliance at last November's
Prague Summit, it was truly a historic step forward. Since the
fall of the Berlin Wall and communism more than a decade ago,
the U.S. and our Allies have pursued the strategic aim of creating
a Europe whole, free, secure and at peace. This has been President
George Bush's objective as it was of President Clinton and of
President George Herbert Walker Bush, with wide bipartisan support
– to firmly anchor the nations of Central and Eastern
Europe in both NATO and the European Union.
NATO's enlargement, coupled with enlargement of the EU, will
move Europe beyond the divisions and instability that made the
20th century one of history's bloodiest. This is a profound
achievement for the United States and our European Allies.
We have pushed these countries hard to be ready for NATO membership.
Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since becoming
candidates for NATO membership, the seven invited nations have
joined Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in consolidating
democracy and free markets in that half of Europe closed behind
the Iron Curtain during the Cold War. The prospect of Alliance
membership has helped to erase old dividing lines and shift
Europe and NATO's center of gravity eastward, broadening security
and stability on a continent that has seen too little of both.
Mr. Chairman, my recommendation of ratification is based on
months and years of work by our government with the invited
countries. Twice last year, in February and in October, I led
a U.S. interagency team to the seven invited nations -- as well
as to Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
-- to assess their readiness for NATO membership. During these
visits, as well as in Brussels and at the Vilnius-10 Summit
in Riga last July, our team met with every President, Prime
Minister, Foreign and Defense Minister of the seven nations
-- in well over one hundred separate meetings. Our goal was
to learn as much as we could about these countries' readiness
for NATO membership, and to encourage them to press ahead with
their historic reform efforts.
Based on these meetings and visits, and on our wide-ranging
contacts with these nations at all levels of the U.S. Government,
I believe that all of the invited nations meet NATO's high standards
for membership. All seven are reforming and modernizing their
defense establishments to add strength to NATO's collective
defense capabilities. All have demonstrated a firm commitment
to NATO's community of values by addressing such issues as corruption,
minority rights, regional relations, trafficking in persons,
the legacy of the Holocaust, property restitution, and good
governance. All have responded positively and constructively
to a very intrusive U.S. examination of their efforts, often
beyond the rigors of NATO's Membership Action Plan that all
of the invited nations have endured since 1999.
This is not to say that the invited nations have solved all
their problems. Despite the remarkable progress we have seen,
each of them remains a society in transition from communism
to an open democratic and market-oriented system. Their levels
of progress differ, and many challenges remain. Together with
our Allies, we will need to continue to encourage and support
their reform efforts in the years ahead.
The invited nations are the first to recognize that the job
is not done. They are committed to reform. Their efforts have
not slowed, but rather accelerated, in the months since NATO's
historic decisions in Prague. Each of the Invitees has made
new commitments in writing, at the highest level, to specific
reform measures on a range of issues. These individual Timetables
for the Completion of Reforms were submitted to NATO prior to
the signing of Accession Protocols on March 26. They constitute
important political commitments that will guide their efforts
throughout the accession period and beyond -- and will help
inform Allied parliaments about the status of these nations'
preparations for membership.
Take a look at Romania's reform timetable and you will find
budgetary commitments to enable its anti corruption office to
do its work. Read Bulgaria's and you will see specific steps
that the government is taking to curb illicit arms sales and
safeguard NATO secrets. The timetables of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania outline their strategies for educating their children
about the Holocaust and restituting communal property. Read
Slovenia's timetable and you will find a specific commitment
to increase defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2008. See
Slovakia's for a detailed description of the government's efforts
to improve the situation of its Roma minority.
THE INVITEES
Mr. Chairman, the President's Report to Congress on NATO enlargement,
which was submitted last week, contains a detailed analysis
of each of the invited nations. Rather than review all the findings
of that report, let me try to give you a brief snapshot of these
seven countries, each of which brings a different set of strengths
to the NATO table. Their participation in the MAP and in the
Partnership for Peace "PfP" program has enabled them
to make significant strides in reforming their militaries and
in enhancing the interoperability of their armed forces with
NATO. Furthermore, each of these countries has also made important
political and military contributions to the security challenges
we face – in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and
in some cases in all three theaters.
Romania, the largest of the invited nations, self-deployed
over 400 combat troops to Afghanistan and now has a 70-strong
nuclear/biological/chemical defense team on the ground in Kuwait
in support of the coalition, with more personnel en route. Again
and again, Romania has demonstrated the ambition, and the means,
to play a major role in NATO as a close Ally of the U.S. The
government is also showing a clear commitment to tackling its
remaining reform challenges, including corruption and cementing
the rule of law, where much work remains to be done.
Like Romania, Bulgaria has been with us every step of the way
on Iraq -- despite calls from some other parts of Europe to
remain on the sidelines. Bulgaria has played a key role in UN
Security Council deliberations, joined our Coalition, and contributed
a nuclear/biological/chemical defense team to the Iraqi theater
of operations as well as airfields for our movements to and
from Afghanistan. Bringing Bulgaria and Romania into NATO would
further extend stability into Europe's most troubled region
-- southeast Europe. Bulgaria's government has taken numerous
painful steps on defense reform, including destroying its SS-23
and SCUD missiles and reducing the size of its armed forces
by the thousands. Moreover, Bulgaria is working closely with
us to tighten export controls and protect NATO classified information.
These are tough challenges, but I am confident that the government
will succeed on both counts.
Like Bulgaria and Romania, Slovakia has faced the challenge
of reducing a large, antiquated military machine inherited from
its Warsaw Pact past -- and is accomplishing this task with
success. Slovakia's military is capable of making a significant
contribution to Alliance defense, including through its mechanized
infantry battalion for NATO-led operations and its nuclear/biological/chemical
defense team now on the ground in Kuwait in support of the coalition.
Slovakia is also on a very positive political and economic trajectory,
having put the autocrat Vladimir Meciar out to pasture in last
September's elections, and is making good progress on remaining
problems such as integration of the Roma and fighting corruption.
One week ago, Slovenia surprised many by winning its referendum
on NATO membership by a two-to-one margin, a tribute to the
efforts of its government and -- I believe -- to the wisdom
of its people. The mandate that the government has received
bodes very well for Slovenia's future contributions to the Alliance.
With its model democracy and strong economy, we can expect Slovenia
to continue to serve as a leader in the Balkans, in areas like
de-mining and mountain warfare training. We welcome the government's
commitment to raise defense spending every year from now until
it reaches 2 percent of GDP by 2008.
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are well prepared to take up
the responsibilities of NATO membership. Though small, they
have worked hard for a decade to develop niche military capabilities
to fill Alliance shortfalls, and we can expect continuing staunch
support from them for U.S. objectives. All three have contributed
troops to NATO-led operations in the Balkans and all three are
on the ground with us in Afghanistan. All three have joined
the coalition to disarm Saddam Hussein, and all are taking steps
to deploy military personnel to the theater for purposes of
peacekeeping and reconstruction. The Senate and successive U.S.
Administrations deserve credit for having been true and loyal
friends of the Baltic States. The U.S. never recognized their
illegal annexation by the Soviet Union and stood by them as
they built their new democracies. These are truly admirable
countries, freed forever from totalitarianism, and ready to
enjoy the benefits of freedom and security that they surely
deserve.
A MORE ATLANTICIST ALLIANCE
Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to consider not only
the objective qualifications of the seven invited nations, but
also the factors that have led them to seek membership in NATO,
what kind of Alliance they are interested in joining, and how
this affects more broadly U.S. national security interests.
In the thousands of miles that my colleagues and I have traveled,
and in the hundreds of meetings that we have held -- not only
with government officials but with members of the opposition,
public opinion leaders, and civil society as well -- we have
heard time and again how grateful the invited nations are for
the leadership that the U.S. has shown on enlargement and in
strengthening security in the Euro-Atlantic area.
When I first took up my assignment in Brussels in the summer
of 2001, the conventional wisdom at NATO was that somewhere
between one and four nations might receive Prague Summit invitations
certainly not seven. It was President Bush's vision - first
articulated in Warsaw earlier the same year of an Alliance stretching
"from the Baltics to the Black Sea" - that shifted
the balance at NATO in favor of a robust enlargement. The horrible
events of September 11, 2001 further convinced many at NATO
that the Alliance should expand its ranks with those countries
willing to take risks to win the war on terrorism.
From the very beginning, it was the U.S. that championed the
most robust possible enlargement a fact that has not been lost
on the invitees. They know that if not for U.S. leadership,
NATO membership might not have happened for them. They can thank
President Bush and his predecessors as well as the Senate for
this achievement.
Let there be no doubt -- these are nations that understand
the value of NATO membership and they will never take it for
granted. They will be among our most committed allies when they
walk through NATO's doors as full members. Senator Voinovich
of this committee, who attended the Prague Summit, will recall
the remarkably eloquent words of Latvian President Vike Freiberga
at the North Atlantic Council meeting following her country's
invitation to join the Alliance. She said,
"Our people have been tested in the fires of history,
they have been tempered by suffering and injustice. They know
the meaning and the value of liberty. They know that it is worth
every effort to support it, to maintain it, to stand for it
and to fight for it. We make a solemn pledge and a commitment
here today, on this historic and solemn occasion, that we will
strive to our utmost to do our part to contribute not just to
the strength of the Alliance but to do whatever needs to be
done to create a world where justice and liberty are available
to all."
Hearing those words again, it is easy to understand why President
Bush said at Prague that he expects the invited nations to "refresh
the spirit" of NATO itself.
Some say these nations should be seen and not heard. The U.S.
believes these nations deserve our respect for all they have
done to reassert their own independence and freedom. Theirs
is one of the most dramatic and hopeful stories of our time.
We need to hear their views on the issues of the day, including
on NATO's future. These nations know the meaning of democracy,
having been denied it for so long. They know the value of freedom,
having had theirs crushed by Soviet communism and totalitarianism.
They don't just bring new capabilities to the table; they also
bring strong political will to defend our way of life.
Mr. Chairman, in this new century, we should look at NATO enlargement
not as how many countries we are obligated to defend, but rather
how many countries we can count on to stand with us when the
going gets tough. Size and geography and population count less
than the political will to defend our principles and collective
security.
NEW THREATS/NEW CAPABILITIES
Mr. Chairman, the seven nations that received invitations at
the Prague Summit understand that the threats we face today
are fundamentally different from those of the last century --
that the threats of today come not from strong states within
Europe, but from unstable failed states and terrorist organizations
far from Europe's borders.
As NATO Secretary General George Robertson has said in his
inimitable fashion, "geography will no longer act as our
shield," because the current and future security environment
"does not afford us the luxury of fighting theoretical
battles about what is 'in' and what is 'out of area.'"
In other words, as you famously said, Mr. Chairman, NATO is
either "out of area or out of business."
This was the lesson the United States derived from the tragic
events of September 11 -- that the gravest threats to our security
can come from anywhere on the globe. NATO's future is thus the
defense of peace not just in Europe but wherever threats arise
to all of us in the Euro-Atlantic community. In fact, NATO is
already operating well beyond the borders of our member states,
and that is where NATO belongs. The old "out-of-area"
debate is indeed dead.
Today in Afghanistan, troops from fourteen NATO, and fourteen
NATO Partner, countries make up the vast majority of the 4,500
strong International Stabilization and Assistance Force (ISAF).
In addition, NATO itself has assisted current ISAF lead nations
Germany and the Netherlands with force generation, planning,
intelligence, coordination and information sharing, and communications.
If NATO's past was centered in countering the Soviet threat
to Western Europe, its future must be devoted to meeting the
greatest security challenge this generation faces -- the toxic
mix of terrorism, states that sponsor terrorism, and weapons
of mass destruction far from Europe's shores. NATO needs to
pivot from its inward focus on Europe -- which was necessary
and appropriate during the Cold War -- to an outward focus on
the arc of countries where most of the threats are today --
in Central and South Asia, and in the Middle East.
Mr. Chairman, our transformation agenda for NATO is an ambitious
one, and there are many challenges to overcome. But at the Prague
Summit last November, President Bush and his fellow Heads of
State and Government took historic decisions to set this process
in motion.
The Prague vision was both simple and far-reaching -- to launch
a wholesale transformation of the Alliance for the 21st century.
The old NATO served us well, but because the threats to our
common security had changed, Allies agreed that NATO had to
change with them.
At the Summit, Allies agreed to a three-part reform effort
-- to build new military capabilities to fight terrorism and
the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction and to keep the peace;
to take in new members to broaden NATO's reach; and to nurture
new relationship with Russia, Ukraine, our Mediterranean Dialogue
Partners, and our partners in the Partnership for Peace, particularly
with the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus to extend security
across Eurasia.
NATO's goal of new military capabilities was expressed in the
Prague Capabilities Commitment, through which our European Allies
committed to fill NATO shortfalls in areas such as heavy air
and sealift, air-to-air refueling, precision guided munitions,
and advanced communications. In recent months, Allies have begun
implementing the Prague decisions, pooling their resources by
establishing a number of multinational consortiums aimed at
acquiring these capabilities.
Our challenge between now and the next NATO Summit in mid-2004
is to ensure that our Allies follow through on these commitments
in a tight budget climate. At NATO, we are keeping the heat
on -- both through bilateral pressure and peer group pressure
within the North Atlantic Council. Our most effective lobbying
tactic is through leadership and example. As demonstrated so
vividly again in Iraq, Congress has funded the strongest military
in the world. Allies know what they have to do to catch up.
In Prague, our Allies also agreed to a U.S. proposal to establish
a NATO Response Force to allow us to move more quickly and flexibly
wherever needed. This will be a rotational force that is technologically
advanced, lethal, and has trained and exercised together as
a combined and joint force. The NATO Response Force was Prague's
capability headline; it will also be the most visible determinant
of our success on this front.
This cutting-edge NATO force needs to be matched by similar
streamlining in the NATO command structure, with new technologies
and military doctrines designed to address 21st century threats.
We are making good progress in transforming NATO's structure
and should be able to agree on the key elements by the June
Defense Ministerial.
DEFENSE OF TURKEY IMPASSE
Mr. Chairman, earlier in my remarks I mentioned the very difficult
debate that we had in Brussels several weeks ago regarding the
defense of Turkey. I know that this is an issue of concern to
this committee so I think it is important that I address it.
This was not the first time that NATO members have disagreed
vocally, and publicly, on a difficult issue. The Suez Crisis
and Vietnam were bitter, as was President DeGaulle's decision
in 1966 to withdraw from NATO's integrated military structure.
NATO debate leading up to the 1979 Two-Track Pershing Missile
decision that eventually led to the elimination of an entire
class of nuclear weapons in Europe was coupled with public demonstrations
that rivaled those we have seen during the last month.
My point, Mr. Chairman, in providing this historical perspective,
is that NATO has survived crises in the past, and NATO will
survive this latest episode.
Mr. Chairman, we should also remember that in this latest disagreement,
only three of our Allies opposed the wish of the majority to
respond immediately and positively to Turkey's request for contingency
measures to assist in its defense. Sixteen Allies supported
the proposal, and the divisions were as deep within Europe as
they were across the Atlantic.
For the 15 Allies who stood with Turkey, it was a fundamental
obligation of the Alliance - a matter of principle - to come
to Turkey's aid. The actions of France, Germany and Belgium
led to a crisis of credibility in the Alliance because their
narrow efforts violated the core fabric of NATO -- that we come
to each other's assistance in times of need.
In the end, Germany and Belgium did the right thing, and NATO
met its commitment under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty
by deploying AWAC surveillance aircraft, Patriot missile systems,
and biological and chemical response units to Turkey in order
to deter and defend against Iraqi aggression. Our final success
in breaking the impasse was only made possible by the decision
to meet in NATO's Defense Policy Committee and decide to help
Turkey "at 18" -- that is, without France, which withdrew
from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966.
One of the bright spots in that otherwise frustrating week
was when the Ambassadors of the seven invited nations visited
me in my office to tell me they were with us and would have
supported aid to Turkey if they had been part of the deliberations.
I would have liked to have had them at the table with us that
week, and I look forward to the day when they will be. The seven
invited nations are expecting to join NATO as equal members
on an equal footing, and to have their voices heard and respected
when we differ.
Privately, a few of these Ambassadors told me that their publics
back home were wondering whether NATO's collective defense commitment
was still reliable. I assured them that the U.S. would always
insist that NATO live up to its core responsibility and meet
its commitment to its members -- as we will for them once they
become members.
An Alliance that keeps its word is the kind of Alliance that
the seven invited nations want to join. It is the kind of Alliance
that they are dedicated to preserving. These are countries that
understand the value of freedom and see NATO as the way to maintain
that freedom.
Some commentators have suggested that enlarging the Alliance
by seven will make decision making more cumbersome and difficult.
I agree that this will be a challenge but one that we can manage
well. Gaining consensus did not become more difficult with the
accession of the trans-Atlantic minded Czech Republic, Poland
and Hungary in 1999. On the contrary, NATO's newest members
have shown themselves to be the least likely to block consensus
and among the most likely to seek it. The issue is not the number
of nations at the table, but rather the will to act collectively
and decisively in our common interest.
SIX CHALLENGES
In summing up, Mr. Chairman, as we look toward the next NATO
Summit in mid-2004, we hope the Senate and NATO's other eighteen
National Parliaments will ratify the Accession Protocols so
that we can strengthen NATO with seven new members. We need
these nations with us as we pursue a NATO agenda that is both
clear and complex. Here are the six main challenges for NATO
as I see them:
Our first order of business should be to strengthen NATO's
role in meeting threats outside of Europe. In Afghanistan, NATO
is already providing support to German and other Allies participating
in the International Stabilization and Assistance Force. We
are prepared to favorably consider having NATO provide additional
support should participating Allies request this. Lord Robertson
and some of our Allies would like to see NATO take a larger
role in ISAF. This makes sense to me.
We believe that NATO should also consider a role in rebuilding
Iraq, including WMD destruction, civil-military reconstruction
and contributions to peacekeeping. Rebuilding Iraq will require
a broad coalition and NATO should play its part – ideally
as a collective contributor, but at least as a facilitator of
individual Allied contributions.
NATO's second challenge is to complete the military and defense
transformation of the Alliance that we started at Prague, including
implementing the Prague Capabilities Commitment, establishing
a NATO Response Force, and streamlining our command structure,
to create a more nimble, expeditionary Alliance capable of addressing
the new threats we face today.
Our third challenge is to integrate the seven new members into
the Alliance, provided the Senate and NATO's other parliaments
give their advice and consent to the Accession Protocols. We
intend to work closely with our new members to ensure that they
strengthen Alliance defense capabilities and are on the cutting
edge of NATO's transformation. At the same time, we will continue
to emphasize that NATO's door remains open, including for Albania,
Macedonia, Croatia and others who may apply for membership in
the future, as we pursue our strategic aim of building a unified
and peaceful Europe.
Our fourth challenge is to lift the quality of NATO's relations
with Partner nations, to realize the full potential of the NATO-Russia
Council and to further support reform in Ukraine. We also want
to make a major push this year to jumpstart NATO's interaction
with Partners in Central Asia and the Caucasus on the front
lines of the war against terrorism. In addition, we should do
more with Middle Eastern countries through NATO's Mediterranean
Dialogue.
Our fifth challenge is to work more effectively with the European
Union. The recent NATO-EU breakthrough on Berlin-plus arrangements
sets the stage for greatly enhanced strategic security cooperation.
We now have the opportunity for a cooperative -- not competitive
-- relationship. Just yesterday, Mr. Chairman, NATO handed over
its peacekeeping operation in Macedonia to the EU, on the basis
of these arrrangements. We should seize this opportunity while
recognizing that NATO will remain Europe's preeminent security
organization. We must preserve and protect NATO's interests
as we move ahead with the EU.
Sixth, we should be true to NATO's commitments in Bosnia and
Kosovo. The recent tragic assassination of Serbian Prime Minister
Djindjic reminds us of the risks that reformers take each day
to secure a better future for their nations. We must continue
to support their efforts. At the same time, we should look for
additional opportunities to integrate the nations of this troubled
region into the Euro-Atlantic community. This should eventually
include the transformation of the Alliance's role in Bosnia
and Kosovo to civilian authorities.
PRESERVING THE TRANS-ATLANTIC LINK
Mr. Chairman, let me close with just a few words about why
I believe the United States should stay engaged with our Allies
through NATO.
While it may sometimes be necessary to go it alone in the world,
it is always preferable to act with our Allies and friends.
As Churchill said, "the only thing worse than fighting
with Allies is fighting without them."
For more than a half-century, NATO has been our most important
Alliance and the strongest bridge across the Atlantic, linking
North America and Europe in a community of shared democratic
traditions and values. We should continue to ask NATO to play
this role, and to adapt to help us meet the new threats of the
21st century.
Mr. Chairman, we will continue to rely on our Allies to share
the risks with us in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan
and Iraq, and to work with them in the war against terrorism.
Their contributions make us a stronger nation, and will give
us a more secure and peaceful world.
I do not underestimate the challenges that lie ahead, but I
am confident that we are on the right path and that the seven
invited countries will strengthen the Alliance, refresh its
spirit and infuse it with a stronger political will.
Amid all that has happened since September 11, 2001, many have
asked if NATO still has a future and is still relevant to the
U.S. and its allies. Mr. Chairman, I am firmly of the view that
NATO will remain central to American national interests and
to those of our European Allies for as far into the future that
we can see. NATO is vital because it is America's only permanent
bridge to Europe; it is the expression of our commitment to
each other's defense; it is the vehicle through which we continue
to maintain the peace in Europe and by which we must now address
threats outside of Europe. As we reaffirm and rebuild our sometimes
troubled Trans-Atlantic ties from the debates of the past few
months over Iraq, NATO is one of our key instruments. We should
continue to depend on NATO and to believe in it as a guidepost
for our future in Europe and beyond.
Mr. Chairman distinguished Members of this Committee, thank
you very much for inviting me here. I will be happy to respond
to any questions or comments that you have.
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